









It's all a question of story.  We are in trouble just now because we . . . 
are in between stories.  The old story, the account of how the world came to be 
and how we fit into it, . . . sustained us for a long period of time.  It shaped our 
emotional attitudes, provided us with life purposes, and energized action.  It 
consecrated suffering and integrated knowledge.  We awoke in the morning 
and knew where we were.  We could answer the questions of our children. . . . 






Thomas Berry was a visionary.  He told new stories about the Universe and our place 
in it, stories not only about where we have been and where we seem to be going, but also 
stories about where we could go, if only we exercised our freedom in different ways.
3
  Indeed, 
story, myth, and narrative played a central role in Berry’s thinking, as the epigraph to this 
essay indicates. 
Every individual life and every society is an enactment of a story people tell 
themselves about the nature and purpose of their existence and of the world they live in.  
These stories shape our experiences and guide our thoughts and actions—for better or for 
worse, consciously or unconsciously.  Needless to say, Berry was deeply troubled by the 
dominant story of our times.  Put simply, he felt it was a story of Earth as a limitless resource 
to be exploited for human gratification, a story which not only degraded the integrity of our 
living planet but also promoted a materialistic attitude to life by equating happiness and 
well-being with increased opportunities to accumulate and consume.  Berry tried to provoke 
us into reconsidering this story.  He tried to unsettle and inspire us, by telling new stories.  As 




For this symposium, rather than offering a close reading of Berry’s writings in Earth 
Jurisprudence, I have dared to experiment with story, inspired by those writings.  Due to the 
unconventional nature of my undertaking, I have avoided direct reference to Berry’s writings, 
but the influence of those writings should be clear, everywhere lying just beneath the surface.  
In an attempt to build upon Berry’s Earth scholarship and contribute in some modest way to 
the Great Work, I will tell a story of the future, a possible future that was conceived of in 
between the poles of pessimism and optimism but which is ultimately based upon a faith in 
                                                 
1
 Samuel Alexander is a sessional lecturer at Melbourne Law School, Australia, and has recently 
submitted his Ph.D. there.  Contact: samuelalexander42@gmail.com.  Website: www.simplicitycollective.com.  
The author would like to acknowledge the debts owed to Jane Goddard, Esq. and the editorial team at the Center 
for Earth Jurisprudence, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, as well as for formatting 
assistance.  Many thanks also to Professor Lee Godden and Katherine Copsey for helpful comments.  The usual 
provisos apply. 
2
 THE DREAM OF THE EARTH 123 (1990). 
3
 THOMAS BERRY, THE GREAT WORK: OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE (1999); BRIAN SWIMME & THOMAS 
BERRY, THE UNIVERSE STORY:  FROM THE PRIMORDIAL FLARING FORTH TO THE ECOZOIC ERA (1992). 
4
 See also Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative:  An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 146 (1985) (―[W]hen we [lawyers] discuss what is possible, what we desire and what we 
dread, we quite naturally turn to stories about hypothetical communities and the legal actors and forms within 
those communities.‖). 
Summer 2011  Looking Backward From the Year 2099 
26 
 
the human spirit to meet the challenges of creating an Ecozoic era.
5
  Though I cannot be sure 
Berry would have agreed with all the conclusions drawn or speculations made, I believe he 
would have been sympathetic to my general undertaking. 
What follows is an attempt to look back on the 21st Century from the vantage point of 
the year 2099.
6
  It takes the form of an essay, entitled The Path to Entropia, written for the 
journal Possibility by Lennox Kingston, a 90-year-old, retired Professor of Legal and 
Political History.
7
  Motivated by various themes in Earth Jurisprudence, the essay reviews 
how attitudes toward consumption and economic growth underwent a radical shift over the 
course of the 21st Century and how this affected, through legal reform, the social, political, 
and economic order of late capitalism.  Particular attention is given to the legal evolution of 
property rights and the cultural movements that made this evolution possible.  Whether the 
changes described are a cause or effect of a shift in human consciousness in relation to Earth 
is a question that I leave open for future reflection.
8
 
I dedicate this experimental story to the memory of Thomas Berry. 
 
THE PATH TO ENTROPIA 
Lennox Kingston 
81 Possibility 9 (2099) 
 
I.  PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 
 
 The Ecozoic Movements, which emerged with loud warnings in the final decades of 
20th Century and which promised so much in the early decades of 21st Century,
9
 ultimately 
failed to prevent corporate profiteers and the consumer class from having a devastating and 
irreversible impact on global ecosystems and biodiversity.  Scientists, who used to categorize 
geological ages into periods of millions of years, now commonly use the term 
―Anthropocene‖ to refer to the last three hundred years only.  During this geological blink-of-
an-eye, human economic activity violently degraded the planet in many ways, including 
pervasive deforestation and the mass extinction of species, climate destabilization, soil 
erosion, ocean acidification and depletion, and the near exhaustion of many non-renewable 
resources, most notably, oil.
10
  Though recent decades of sustained and dedicated 
commitment to the Great Restoration seem to have stabilized the biosphere and lessened the 
threat of ecosystemic collapse, our world has changed and there is no going back.  History 
will never forget that fateful day in 2061 when nine billion people watched their television 
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screens in silence as the last fragments of the polar ice cap melted away forever, stamping our 
age with a new image of Earth.  It was in 1968 when the Apollo spaceship first captured 
those iconic pictures of our fragile planet floating mysteriously through the dark heavens of 
outer space.  Fewer than one hundred years later human beings had altered that cosmological 
scene. 
We need not review here the catastrophic effect rising sea levels had on the lives of 
millions of environmental refugees, to say nothing of the other humanitarian crises, including 
the Water Wars, which were also causally linked to climate change.  Nor is there any need to 
contribute a word further to the massive literature on the breakdown of global economic 
institutions during the Lost Years of 2031-34, from which the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and most transnational corporations never recovered.  We know about these 
tragic, destabilizing events all too well.  But as the 21st Century draws to a hesitant close—
not with a bang but with a sigh of relief—there may be some value in looking back on our 
long, uncertain, and painful recovery from these events, if only so that we may better 
understand the present as we look to the future.  It is a recovery which we must attribute 
primarily to all those in the Ecozoic Movements who, despite repeated, harrowing 
disappointments, kept fighting tirelessly for the cause they knew to be just. 
 
II.  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF GROWTH ECONOMICS 
 
For most of human history—romantic myths aside—the vast majority of human 
beings lived lives oppressed by material deprivation and insecurity.
11
  Generally speaking, 
human existence was an ongoing struggle for little more than bare subsistence, and for 
several millennia the standard of living of the average person in civilized centers did not rise 
significantly.
12
  But then, in 1712, the steam engine was invented and the First Industrial 
Revolution was set into motion.  Suddenly the energy stored in the planet’s fossilized fuels 
was released in an explosion of mechanized economic activity.  The result was that the 
wealth of nations—primarily Western nations, at least at first—began to grow at exponential 
rates that previous generations would not have thought possible.
13
 
Within those nations that progressed from circumstances of widespread poverty to 
circumstances of moderate or comfortable material security, the human lot seemed to 
improve considerably.
14
  Although there were always costs, sometimes great costs, associated 
with economic growth—e.g., factory labor, pollution, deforestation, social dislocation, and so 
on—for many years these costs were generally outweighed, in terms of human well-being, at 
least, by the huge material benefits that resulted.
15
  This initial success led to the 
entrenchment of what political and economic historians now refer to as ―the growth model of 
progress.‖ 
Put simply, the growth model assumed that the overall well-being of a society was 
approximately proportional to the size of its economy, because more money or higher Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) meant that more individual or social ―preferences‖ could be 
satisfied via market transactions.
16
  No matter how rich a society became, growing the 
economy was thought to be the only effective way to eliminate poverty, reduce inequality and 
unemployment, properly fund schools, hospitals, the arts, scientific research, environmental 
protection programs, and so on.  In other words, the underlying social problem (even within 
the richest nations) was believed to be a lack of money, and thus for more than two centuries 
economic growth was heralded across the political spectrum as the goal toward which 
societies should direct their collective energy.  The notion of a macroeconomic ―optimal 
scale‖ was all but unthinkable.  It was assumed that a bigger economy was always better.
17
 
This growth model of progress, as we now know, turned out to be dangerously flawed, 
although dislodging it from the social imagination proved exceedingly difficult.  John Stuart 
Mill, writing in 1848, was one of the first to point out that the costs of economic growth may 
one day outweigh the benefits, at which time, he argued, the most appropriate form of 
government would be ―the stationary state.‖
18
  By this he meant a condition of zero growth in 
population and physical capital stock, but with continued improvement in technology and in 
what he called ―the Art of Living.‖
19
  This aspect of his oeuvre, however—today his most 
famous—was either ignored or summarily dismissed by his contemporaries, and for several 
generations it lay forgotten in the intellectual dustbin.  Growth scepticism was revived and 
updated in the late 1960s by the economist Ezra Mishan,
20
 and developed further in the 1970s 











  But although these theorists attained a certain short-lived notoriety 
within the intelligentsia and certain counter-cultures, for a long time their work had no 
significant political impact at all.  Economic growth remained the overriding objective of 
governments across the globe.
26
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In the late 20th Century and early 21st Century, as the costs of economic growth 
became more pronounced and harder to tolerate, the undercurrent of growth scepticism 
slowly strengthened and began entering the intellectual mainstream.
27
  Many rigorous and 
credible sociological studies showed that, from about the 1970s onward, economic growth in 
most Western societies had stopped contributing significantly to human well-being.
28
  That is, 
it became apparent that a rise in material ―standard of living‖ (measured by per capita income) 
was no longer strongly correlated with ―quality of life‖ (measured by subjective well-
being).
29
  Indeed, economic growth had even begun undermining many of the things upon 
which well-being depended, such as responsive democratic institutions, social solidarity, 
spiritual and aesthetic experience, and stable, functioning ecosystems.
30
  The clear 
implication of these findings was that economic growth should no longer be the primary 
measure of policy and institutional success within Western societies.
31
  But, again, the impact 
of this scholarship was very limited, at least for a time.  Corporate interests ensured that 
growth economics remained firmly entrenched in the political realm, and well into the 21st 
Century the reigning orthodoxy was that the answer to almost every problem—including 
environmental problems—was more economic growth.
32
 
Below we will review the broad legal and political reforms that eventually helped free 
the world from this growth fetish.  Before doing so, however, we should direct our attention 
to the cultural movements that put those reforms on the political agenda and which were the 
driving force behind their implementation.  Admittedly, this inquiry is bound to oversimplify 
the catalysts of change, because the extensive institutional restructuring which occurred over 
the 21st Century doubtless had an infinite array of causes.  Nevertheless, historians generally 
accept that within Western societies, at least, there were two causes of particular significance:  
the first being a destabilizing but ultimately productive disillusionment with ―top-down‖ 
politics; the second being a radical transformation in attitudes toward personal consumption.  
Let us briefly consider these matters in turn. 
The onset of chronic disillusionment with ―top-down‖ or ―representative‖ politics is 
typically traced back to the years 2007-09.  During these years there were two events of 
global significance which tested the capacity of democratic systems to function for the 
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common good.  The first was the ―Global Financial Crisis‖ (GFC); the second was the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
The GFC had its roots in the so-called ―credit crunch‖ of July 2007, when a loss of 
confidence by U.S. investors in the value of sub-prime mortgages caused a liquidity crisis.
33
  
Due to unscrupulous lending by several mega-banks—a process which had been 
insufficiently regulated and, indeed, had been systematically encouraged—a huge number of 
homeowners in the United States found that they were unable to meet their mortgage 
repayments.  But when the housing market crashed, banks found that the repossessed houses 
and land were worth less than what the bank had originally loaned out.  This resulted in the 
liquidity crisis.  The consequence was that it became increasingly difficult to obtain loans, 
investments dried up, and consumer confidence was shattered, all of which ended up having 
hugely negative impacts on the global economy.
34
  Moreover, many of the mega-banks were 
on the brink of collapse.  Because those banks were ―too big to fail,‖
35
 however, governments 
were essentially forced to bail out the very institutions which caused the crisis in the first 
place.  This approach proved to be efficacious, in the sense, at least, that over the next two 
years the global economy slowly recovered, not without great hardship to many millions of 
people.  But as ―business as usual‖ resumed, there was the deeply troubling sense that 
nothing of any significance had been done to rein in the vast powers of privately owned 
financial institutions or to protect people from history repeating itself.
36
  In short, Western 
governments of the time proved to be either impotent in the face of corporate power or 
unwilling to confront it. 
Much the same can be said of the pivotal Climate Change Conference held in 
Copenhagen during December 2009.  By this stage the state of scientific research meant that 
it was no longer credible to deny the reality of climate change or to deny the potentially 
catastrophic consequences
37
—later realized, of course—of failing to significantly reduce 
global carbon emissions without delay.  Despite the clarity and force of the scientific 
warnings, however, the Copenhagen conference lacked any real sense of urgency and was 
considered a despairing failure both by and for the Ecozoic Movements.  Eventually a weak, 
non-binding Emissions Trading Scheme was agreed to, heralded by some as the salvation of 
Earth, but the very method of trying to use market mechanisms to solve a problem essentially 
caused by markets was doomed to failure—and fail it did.  Looking back we see that 
Copenhagen was a great crossroad for humanity, a final opportunity to take climate change 
seriously.  Vested interests in the economic status quo, however, were able to keep growth 
capitalism firmly on track, leading not to a decline but, for too many years, a continued rise in 
emissions. 
Whether it was due to impotence, incompetence, or sheer unwillingness to face the 
facts, it must be said that at Copenhagen the political response to the ecological crisis—the 
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response from the Western nations, in particular—was a profound dereliction of duty.
38
  Not 
only that, its short-sightedness was economically irrational, because the financial costs of 
taking genuine preventative action at that stage would have paled in comparison to the costs 
of what lay ahead.
39
  At this time democratic rule may still have been ―of the people,‖ but 
there was a growing suspicion that it was no longer ―by the people‖ or ―for the people.‖ 
And so it was that Western citizenries began to lose faith, as never before, in 
representative democracy.  The most significant political decisions of the age were widely 
perceived to be dishonourable capitulations before corporate power.  Furthermore, the ballot 
box seemed to provide no avenue for redress, because it was understood to merely offer the 
choice between two or three essentially corporate parties.  In such destabilizing 
circumstances, one of two things tends to happen:  either democratic subjects violently 
overthrow the unrepresentative government, or those subjects take government into their own 
hands at the local level.  For several years, as the collective rumbling grew to a crescendo, 
political commentators were unsure which course of action would prevail, and some even 
voiced their concerns about the prospect of wholesale collapse of democratic processes and 
the rise of fascist or totalitarian politics in the West.  More pessimistically still, others 
predicted the collapse of human civilization itself.
40
 
But rather than a violent revolutionary movement, what in fact emerged was a highly-
agitated (though inspired), grass-roots democratic culture based on local participation, 
community activism, and personal responsibility.
41
  Though the essential structure of 
representative democracy remained in place, how it functioned changed in almost 
unrecognizable ways.  Most notably, the Local Life Networks and the Online Referenda 
which today structure government so effectively, and which are able to instruct Members of 
Parliament so precisely and efficiently, would have been considered utopian dreams not so 
long ago.  Leaving the details aside, however, our present point is simply that the 
disillusionment with ―top-down‖ politics gave birth to an activist, grass-roots culture, 
animated by the belief that another world was possible.
42
  Through sophisticated 
organizational techniques, this culture was able to change the nature of representative 
democracy by taking the power out of the hands of corporations and placing it in the hands of 
the people.  This transition naturally faced fierce resistance from the economic elite, who had 
grown accustomed to getting their own way.  But the tide of participatory democracy proved 
to be unstoppable.  As corporate influence over governments faded, new space opened up 
within Western democracies, and elsewhere, for radical political reform.
43
 
Of course, the mere possibility of radical political reform did not guarantee that 
anything much would change, nor, if change were to come about, did it imply a particular 
direction.  But when democratic processes are functioning sufficiently well, changes to the 
legal and political structure of a society tend to reflect cultural values, like a ―magic mirror,‖ 
to revive Kermit Hall’s old metaphor.
44
  This notion that ―law reflects culture‖ leads us to the 
second major reason, mentioned earlier, for the demise of growth politics in the West—
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namely, the radical transformation in attitudes toward personal consumption that occurred 
during the second and third decades of this century. 
The legal and political structures of growth capitalism ultimately depended upon a 
culture of consumption, that is, upon a populace driven by an insatiable craving for more 
consumer goods and services.
45
  Though such commodity fetishism was observable in 
Western societies almost from the onset of industrialization, it was really in the decades after 
the Second World War (during the era sometimes referred to as ―postmodernity‖) when 
consumption became a truly acute and debilitating social practice.
46
  A collective 
psychological disorder by our standards, commodity fetishism reached its zenith at the 
beginning of this century, establishing a materialistic culture without any sense of sufficiency.  
For reasons we still do not wholly understand, life in postmodernity was structured around 
the pursuit of luxuries and comforts merely, and no matter how rich people became, it never 
seemed to be enough.
47
 
Unsurprisingly, during this era the West entered a phase of social decay.
48
  Despite 
unprecedented levels of material wealth and sophisticated technologies, most Westerners 
during these times were working longer hours than they had in the past,
49
 and aside from 
working and sleeping, Westerners generally spent more time watching television than doing 
anything else.
50
  The division of labor reached an extreme, which may have efficiently 
maximized economic growth, but it also meant that people became wholly dependent on the 
market and thus were locked upon a consumerist treadmill that had no end and attained no 
lasting satisfaction.
51
  Furthermore, urban sprawl led to highly artificial living environments 
that disconnected people from a community of neighbors and from any real engagement with 
nature.
52
  This was the culture that transnational corporations celebrated as the ultimate 
fulfilment of human destiny, the peak of civilization. 
So long as most people felt that a higher material ―standard of living‖ was needed to 
increase ―quality of life,‖ growth capitalism was politically safe.
53
  However, what is kept 
alive by the citizenry can also, through a change in consciousness, be transformed by it.  This 
subversive thesis was famously advanced during the counter-cultural movements of the 
1960s and 1970s, and was neatly captured in their slogan ―revolution by consciousness.‖
54
  
But it was not until the so-called ―New Generation‖ counter-cultural movements of the 2010s 
and early-to-mid-2020s did a ―revolution by consciousness‖ genuinely threaten to become a 
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socio-political reality.  Of those counter-cultural movements, one in particular—which came 
to be known as the Voluntary Simplicity Movement
55
—deserves our immediate attention, as 
it undermined growth capitalism and consumer culture most directly.  Its unexpected 
emergence and impact remains a subject of fascination amongst cultural historians, even if 
the radical ideas upon which it was based seem rather mundane in an age, such as our own, 
that accepts them unquestioningly as expressing the plainest commonsense.  Let our 
examination, then, be brief. 
The emergence of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement was inextricably intertwined 
with the rise of grass-roots politics, which we have seen was a reaction against the 
undemocratic influence corporations had on ―political representatives.‖  But it was not 
enough simply to wrestle political power from corporations; the grass-roots culture had to 
know what to do with power should it succeed in attaining it, and thus it needed a guiding 
philosophy.  Furthermore, because the grass-roots culture upheld ―personal action‖ as the 
means to social and political transformation, people realized that they needed to seriously 
explore, en mass, ways they could oppose growth capitalism in their daily lives.  An 
attractive, meaningful, and coherent philosophy of living was found in the theory and practice 
of voluntary simplicity.  Before proceeding, it may be helpful to present a short statement of 
this philosophy:  first, so that we appreciate its stark contrast with consumerism, and second, 
to make explicit the ethics of consumption that came to inform the (soon-to-be-considered) 
politics beyond growth economics. 
The following definition serves our purposes.  It is taken from the introduction to an 
early anthology on voluntary simplicity, published ninety years ago at the height of consumer 
culture: 
 
Voluntary simplicity is a post-consumerist living strategy that rejects 
that materialistic lifestyles of consumer culture and affirms what is often just 
called ―the simple life,‖ or ―downshifting.‖  The rejection of consumerism 
arises out of the recognition that ordinary Western-style consumption habits 
are destroying the planet; that lives of high consumption are unethical in a 
world of great human need; and that the meaning of life does not and cannot 
consist in the consumption and accumulation of material things.  Extravagance 
and acquisitiveness are thus considered a despairing waste of life, not so much 
sad as foolish, and certainly not deserving of the social status and admiration 
that they seem to attractive today.  The affirmation of simplicity arises out of 
the recognition that very little is needed to live well—that abundance is a state 
of mind, not a quantity of consumer products or attainable through them. 
 
Sometimes called ―the quiet revolution,‖ this approach to life involves 
providing for material needs as simply and directly as possible, minimizing 
expenditure on consumer goods and services, and directing progressively more 
time and energy toward pursuing non-materialistic sources of satisfaction and 
meaning.  This generally means accepting a lower income and a lower level of 
consumption, in exchange for more time and energy to pursue other life goals, 
such as community or social engagements, family time, artistic or intellectual 
projects, more fulfilling employment, political participation, sustainable living, 
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spiritual exploration, reading, conversation, contemplation, relaxation, 
pleasure-seeking, love, and so on—none of which need to rely on money, or 
much money.  The grounding assumption of voluntary simplicity is that 
human beings are inherently capable of living meaningful, free, happy, and 
infinitely diverse lives, while consuming no more than an equitable share of 
nature.  Ancient but ever-new, the message is that those who know they have 
enough are rich. 
 
According to this view, personal and social progress is measured not 
by the conspicuous display of wealth or status, but by increases in the 
qualitative richness of daily living, the cultivation of relationships, and the 
development of social, intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual potentials.  As 
Duane Elgin has famously defined it, voluntary simplicity is ―a manner of 
living that is outwardly simple and inwardly rich, . . . a deliberate choice to 
live with less in the belief that more life will be returned to us in the process.‖ 
 
Voluntary simplicity does not, however, mean living in poverty, 
becoming an ascetic monk, or indiscriminately renouncing all the advantages 
of science and technology.  It does not involve regressing to a primitive state 
or becoming a self-righteous puritan.  And it is not some escapist fad reserved 
for saints, hippies, or eccentric outsiders.  Rather, by examining afresh our 
relationship with money, material possessions, the planet, ourselves and each 
other, the simple life of voluntary simplicity is about discovering the freedom 
and contentment that comes with knowing how much consumption is truly 
―enough.‖  And this might be a theme that has something to say to everyone, 
especially those of us who are every day bombarded with thousands of cultural 
and institutional messages insisting that ―more is always better.‖  Voluntary 
simplicity is an art of living that is aglow with the insight that ―just enough is 
plenty.‖ 
 
The spirit of late capitalist society, however, cries out like a banshee 
for us to expend our lives pursuing middle-class luxuries and coloured paper, 
for us to become faceless bodies dedicated to no higher purpose than the 
acquisition of ―nice things.‖  We can embrace that comfortable unfreedom if 
we wish, that bourgeois compromise.  But it is not the only way to live. 
 




Of course, this ―art of living‖ was not by any means new.  The virtues of moderation 
and enlightened material restraint had been integral to almost all ancient wisdom and spiritual 
traditions, with prominent advocates including Lao Tzu, Confucius, Buddha, the Stoics, Jesus, 
Mohammad, St. Francis, the Quakers, John Ruskin, the New England Transcendentalists 
(especially Henry David Thoreau), Gandhi, Richard Gregg, and many of the indigenous 
peoples around the world.
57
  But in postmodernity, when consumption was glorified and 
luxury admired as never before, voluntary simplicity acquired a special significance. 
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Exactly why the Voluntary Simplicity Movement became a powerful oppositional 
force in the second and third decades of this century remains something of a mystery, as 
noted above.  Few saw it coming or even recognized the signs of its emergence until it had 
already arrived.  Notions of simplicity spread, here and there, person to person, community to 
community, as if by means invisible.  Perhaps the idea just gave people hope?  The 
Movement had no leader, as such, though it developed strong social networks.  It received 
almost no support from mass media.  Even politicians, despite their rhetoric of sustainability, 
were reticent to promote simplicity for fear that widespread reductions in personal 
consumption would slow economic growth.  But still the light of simplicity began to dawn 
gradually over the whole. 
Perhaps Theodore Roszack, writing in the depths of consumer culture, was the most 
prescient: 
 
There is one way forward:  the creation of flesh-and-blood examples of low-
consumption, high-quality alternatives to the mainstream pattern of life.  This 
we can see happening already on the counter cultural fringes.  And nothing—
no amount of argument or research—will take the place of such living proof.  
What people must see is that ecologically sane, socially responsible living is 





In the end, the nature of any society is shaped primarily by the countless number of 
small decisions made by private individuals.
59
  With respect to the Voluntary Simplicity 
Movement, those small decisions, those small acts of simplification—insignificant though 
they may have seemed in isolation—were ultimately of revolutionary significance when 
added up and taken as a whole.  But this ―quiet revolution,‖ as it came to be known, was not 
like revolutions of the past.  It originated with the individual and with culture.  It did not need 
violence to succeed, and it could not have been successfully resisted by violence.  And it 




III.  POLITICIZING THE ECONOMY:  THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 
 
By the end of the 2020s, the Voluntary Simplicity Movement had become a 
significant oppositional force, and it would continue to strengthen and expand every year.  
Though it had not, at this stage, achieved the cultural paradigm shift it sought, and though its 
political impact had so far been quite modest, the line between counter-culture and 
mainstream had certainly blurred, which is always a sign of great social transition.  Within 
large sectors of Western societies attitudes to consumption changed drastically.  Luxurious 
and extravagant lifestyles, once almost universally admired and envied, had come to be seen 
by many as tasteless ostentation, improper in an age of ecological crisis and great human 
need, and certainly not a reliable path to personal well-being.
61
  Furthermore, simple living 
had become a socially accepted alternative lifestyle, which made stepping out of the 
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mainstream much less isolating, thus hastening the demise of consumer culture.  All this had 
discernable social and ecological benefits.
62
 
Nevertheless, despite significant cultural transformation in attitudes to consumption, 
around this time many within the Voluntary Simplicity Movement came to a troubling 
realization.  It was becoming apparent that even those who genuinely wished to embrace 
voluntary simplicity as an oppositional living strategy were finding the practice of simplicity 
extremely challenging, especially in urban centers.
63
  Put otherwise, it seemed that political 
and economic institutions, and social infrastructure, were functioning to lock many people 
into high-impact consumerist lifestyles, despite their desire for a simpler way of life.
64
  There 
had, of course, always been an undercurrent within the Voluntary Simplicity Movement that 
insisted that personal action alone was never going to be enough to achieve sustainability and 
social justice—that political engagement was necessary.  But few had appreciated quite how 
hard it would be to create a simpler form of life from within an institutional framework based 
on materialistic values.  By the late 2020s, however, it had become obvious to all that the 
socio-cultural movement away from consumerism needed to be supplemented and facilitated 
by a politico-legal movement away from growth economics, and that latter transition is the 
one to which we must now turn our attention. 
Before we review the specific structural reforms that resulted from the gradual 
politicization of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement, there is a somewhat abstract matter in 
political and legal theory that ought to be addressed, albeit briefly.  It concerns the nature of 
property rights and the ways in which property rights were perceived to limit state power.  
We must not forget, after all, that in the first half of the 21st Century, ―neoliberalism‖ was the 
dominant political ideology, one of the central assumptions of which was that, prima facie, 
the state had no right to interfere in the economy.
65
  This assumption had certain problematic 
implications for those seeking political reform.  Let us consider those implications, for 
together they represent the last major obstacle that had to be overcome on the path to 
revolutionary reform. 
When participants in the Voluntary Simplicity Movement first began seriously 
advocating political reform of the economy, they faced three fundamental objections arising 
out of neoliberal ideology:  1) that the reforms advocated would result in a property system 
that was no longer a private property system (and, if true, this was widely considered to be a 
knock-down argument, politically speaking); 2) that the reforms, by interfering in the 
property system, would violate the liberally revered ―private sphere‖ into which the state 
purportedly had no right to enter; and 3) that the reforms would arbitrarily interfere with the 
natural result of voluntary transactions made within the neutral and non-coercive ―free 
market‖ system. 
These objections were not new and, indeed, they had been fairly well answered in the 
20th Century by other progressive intellectual movements such as Legal Realism, Critical 
Legal Studies, and Social Relations Theory.
66
  Accordingly, the Voluntary Simplicity 
Movement did not really need to develop new intellectual tools to respond to those objections, 
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but it certainly needed to, and did, campaign laboriously to weaken the hold neoliberalism 
had on the popular consciousness.  The following excerpt is taken from an anonymous 
political pamphlet distributed by the Voluntary Simplicity Movement during its influential 
internet campaign of 2034-5.  It is quoted at some length because it responds, quite directly, 
to the three objections stated above: 
 
Our detractors rely on an ―essentialist‖ view of property.  They assume 
that there is a concept of property that, in fact, is the right one or the only one; 
that there is a conception of property that is the concept of property.  But the 
indeterminacy critique has thoroughly discredited any such claim to 
essentialism.  The ―bundle of rights‖ conception of property, in particular, 
though it is hardly a complete or uncontroversial picture, has shown that we 
cannot say that person owns a resource if and only if that person has certain 
specified rights, powers, liberties, and duties.
67
  In other words, the concept of 
property is one that has many conceptions.
68
  This means that private property 
can take the shape of many different ―bundles,‖ and so it should not be 
conceived of as a fixed, static, or homogenous category, especially since each 
―bundle‖ can be disaggregated into isolated ―sticks.‖  Furthermore, the 
―sticks‖ themselves—such as the ―right to use,‖ the ―right to exclude,‖ the 





This, in short, is the great legacy of Legal Realism to which essentialist 
and absolutist property theorists have never developed a satisfactory 
response.
70
  It is also the legacy upon which our Politics of Entropia are 
founded, for it promisingly demonstrates that there can be private 
property/market systems that are radically different from growth capitalism as 
we know it, since ―private property‖ does not mean one thing, and neither 
does ―the market.‖  Another property system is possible. 
 
Our detractors also claim that our political agenda would involve 
illegitimate state interference in the property and market system.  But this 
objection is analytically outdated.  Critical Legal Studies (CLS) showed long 
ago that for property and property-related concepts (such as ownership, harm, 
rights, wealth, efficiency, free contract, duress, justice, and so on) to become 
concrete conceptions in legal reality, state institutions must be always and 
necessarily involved in defining property rights and market structures.
71
  One 
consequence of this is that the neoliberal demand for state ―non-intervention‖ 
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in the so-called ―private economic sphere‖—where property rights are said to 
be sacrosanct and self-regulating—is an impossible one, and transparently so.  
The state is necessarily implicated in the economy because (among other 
things) it must:  a) provide details on which incidents of ownership will form 
the ―bundle,‖ what each incident entails, and in which circumstances; b) 
define the idea of ―freedom of contract,‖ since it too is not self-defining; c) set 
other ―ground-rules‖ to the economy (such as, ―What can be property?‖; 
―What kind of entities can be agents in the market?‖; and ―What happens 
when property rights conflict?‖); and d) enforce the property rights created by 
a), b), and c).  As one critical theorist noted, ―The question is not whether to 
regulate owners; the question is what kind of property system to create in the 
first place.‖
72
  ―Hands off‖ is simply not an option. 
 
This critique of the private/public distinction exposes how often the 
distinction between the ―free market‖ and ―regulatory systems‖ breaks down, 
a point another theorist has expressed in the following way:  ―There is no 
nonarbitrary way to differentiate the law constituting a market, from the law 
supposedly regulating or intervening in the market.‖
73
  This critique is 
significant because it answers the neoliberal lament that property rights are 
violated whenever the state ―interferes‖ in the economy.  Again, the state is 
necessarily implicated in the economy, and so reformers are entitled to 
question whether society may be better off if the state implicates itself in 
different ways and on a different basis.  What is clear is that this reformist 
approach—which may include ―revolutionary reform‖—cannot be dismissed 
in advance on the basis of an essentialist view of ―private property‖ or ―the 
market,‖ or on the basis that the state ought to stay out of the ―private 
economic sphere,‖ since both essentialism and the private/public distinction 
clearly lie in ruins. 
 
Some detractors within the positivist tradition, however, accept that the 
state is indeed required to define the legal rules governing market transfers, 
private property, and voluntary contracting—since they are not self-defining—
but argue that the rules set up by the state must be neutral.
74
  Legal rules that 
are neutral, the argument goes, would simply facilitate the voluntary exchange 
of private property rights in a free market, and thereby allow individuals to 
pursue their own preferences and visions of the good life without having the 
state impose its preferences or values upon them.  Regulators and reformers, 
according this view, are seen as politically biased people who try to use state 
apparatus to impose their own subjective preferences and values on others, and 
who try to bring about a distribution of wealth and power other than that 
which naturally results when individuals voluntarily exchange property rights 
in a free market. 
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The indeterminacy critique, however, renders this neoliberal view 
incoherent also.  As outlined above, the state is required to make all sorts of 
definitional choices about what the abstract property and property-related 
concepts mean in economic reality, and these choices have significant 
implications for what type of society results.  What CLS made perfectly clear, 
however, is that these choices can never be neutral—first, because there is no 
objective or apolitical standpoint from where those choices could be made, 
and second, because such choices always allocate wealth and power between 
individuals and groups in society.
75
  For these reasons it is wrong to disclaim 
all responsibility for the social and environmental consequences of those 
allocations and blithely say that they are the natural result of free choices 
made within a neutral and non-coercive market framework.
76
  To stress the so-
called neutrality of the ―free market,‖ and to deny that political, value-laden, 
choices inevitably go into its formation, is ideological.
77
  It is a perspective 
that deflects attention away from the political choices benefiting some 
individuals, groups, and interests at the expense of others, and it unduly limits 
what reformative options appear democratically available.  It can make the 
existing property regime (including its concentrations of wealth and structures 
of power) seem ―natural‖ or ―right or ―just the way the world is,‖ when in fact 
that regime is a contingent creation of our choosing, which we have made, and 
which can be democratically remade. 
 




The fundamental point here—a rather obvious one to us—is that property rights are 
not static or determinate entities which exist independently of the state, but are evolving and 
highly malleable creatures of legal convention.  It follows that property rights are also 
inescapably value-laden and context-dependent, meaning that their legitimacy must be 
periodically reassessed as society or the environment changes.  Indeed, the greater the 
changes in context, the greater the need for the reassessment, and perhaps revision, of 
property rights.  These ideas, as they came to be widely understood and accepted, functioned 
to radicalize Western democracies by politicizing the economy.  It was this shift in political 
consciousness which allowed democratic citizens to see that they had the right and the power 
to design (or redesign) the economic framework within which they live their lives, an insight 
which neoliberal ideology had repressed for far too long. 
During this time, as noted above, the Voluntary Simplicity Movement was entering 
the cultural mainstream and beginning to demand some political recognition—sounding the 
death knell for growth capitalism.  Attitudes to consumption had undergone a huge shift 
toward material simplicity, and the time was ripe for the political manifestation of this new 
sensibility.  Furthermore, by this stage the myriad problems of social and ecological over-
consumption had intensified, meaning that a political response could no longer be delayed.  
The Voluntary Simplicity Movement did not waste this opportunity to call for a politics of 
sustainable consumption, a politics beyond growth economics.  And, at last, the call did not 
fall on deaf ears. 
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The world was ready for change. 
 
IV.  A RADICAL POLITICS OF PROPERTY BEYOND GROWTH ECONOMICS 
 
What follows is a review of the matrix of ―revolutionary reforms‖ which resulted 
from the gradual politicization of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement in Western societies 
over the course of the 21st Century.
79
  Obviously, different nations evolved in different ways, 
at different times, and these differences were sometimes considerable.  Indeed, throughout 
the Great Transition an openness to plurality was, and still is, considered a virtue.  
Nevertheless, if we look at the world at the beginning of this century and compare it with 
how it is at the end, it cannot be denied that there has been a recognizable and coherent 
paradigm shift in law, politics, and economics, especially with respect to Western-style 
systems of property.  In what follows an attempt is made to outline, with a very broad brush, 
the most significant features of the new paradigm, beginning with the new indicators of 
progress which were so instrumental in deposing growth economics.  Deferring to convention, 
this new paradigm will be referred to as ―Entropia,‖ which is not a place, as such, so much as 
it is the idealized social, economic, and political order which guided and motivated many of 
the radical law reform movements during this century. 
 
A.  Beyond GDP:  Alternative Indicators of Progress 
 
We saw earlier that during the era of growth capitalism, increasing GDP was the 
overriding objective of governments.
80
  It was an era when economists, policymakers, judges, 
reporters, and the wider public generally relied on GDP as a shorthand indicator of a nation’s 
progress (―the growth model of progress‖).  But GDP is merely a sum of national spending 
which makes no distinctions between transactions that add to well-being and those that 
diminish it; it does not take any account of ecological damage or wealth distribution; and 
anything that is not recorded as a market transaction is excluded from its accounts, such as 
domestic work, volunteering, and leisure.
81
  For these reasons, among others, GDP is a highly 
defective measure of how well-off a society is and a poor indicator of policy and institutional 
success.
82
  When this was eventually recognized and exposed, scholars began developing 
alternative, much more nuanced, measures of societal progress.
83
  One such measure, which 
has gradually received official recognition and respect, is known as the Genuine Progress 
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  Arguably, this development symbolizes better than any other the transition 
from growth capitalism to Entropia. 
The ―extended accounts‖ of the GPI begin with total private consumption expenditure 
and then make reductions for things such as poverty, polarized income distribution, crime, 
resource depletion, pollution, environmental damage, and so on, and additions for things such 
as domestic work, volunteering, increases in leisure, public infrastructure, and the like.
85
  The 
aim is to measure, as accurately as possible, the ―genuine progress‖ of a society, not simply 
the growth of its GDP.
86
  Although the GPI remains an imperfect tool, and so must be 
employed cautiously and tentatively, the significance of it replacing GDP as a measure of 
progress can hardly be overstated.  In essence, public support of the GPI means that political 
parties can campaign for policy and institutional reforms that are likely to genuinely improve 
well-being, even if those reforms would slow or even reduce economic growth.  Once upon a 
time, of course, implementing reforms that would negatively affect growth rates was 
tantamount to committing political suicide.  But by distinguishing genuine progress from 
economic growth, that changed.  In particular, new space opened up within the political arena 
for the following legal reforms in property relations. 
 
B.  Basic Income As a New Property Right 
 
One of the deepest and most enduring criticisms levelled at capitalist societies was 
that, no matter how rich they became, there always remained an underclass of people who 
were unemployed and poverty-stricken.  To permit members of an affluent society to live 
without any secure livelihood seems to us to be an evident moral abomination, but majority 
opinion among earlier generations took it to be regrettable but permissible, perhaps even 
necessary.
87
  Even strong varieties of the ―welfare state‖ were unable to provide all with the 
economic security which we regard as necessary to live a fully human life of freedom and 
dignity, because welfare payments could be denied, delayed, or revoked, for any number of 
reasons.  The politics of Entropia boldly confronted this serious problem with remarkable 
directness, by gradually introducing what is called a ―Basic Income System,‖ otherwise 
known as a ―Simplicity Entitlement.‖
88
 
Although there is considerable variety in forms of Basic Income, the core idea is 
relatively straightforward.  In its idealized form, every permanent resident would receive a 
periodic (e.g. fortnightly) stipend sufficient to live at a culturally defined minimal standard of 
economic security, generally at a level marginally above the culturally specific ―poverty line‖; 
that is, enough to live simply, securely, and with dignity, though, as two commentators put it, 
―extremely modestly.‖
89
  The Basic Income is guaranteed by the state, is unconditional on the 
performance of any labor, and is universal (excepting only those incarcerated).  Parents are 
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the custodians of children’s grants (which are typically somewhat lower than adult grants).  
Within a fully developed Basic Income System most other state transfers can be abolished—
unemployment benefits, family allowances, pensions, and so on—because the Basic Income 
grant is sufficient to provide everyone with a decent, though minimal, subsistence.  Economic 
insecurity, whether from incapacity or unemployment, is therefore essentially eliminated.  
Even minimum wage laws can be somewhat relaxed, because all earning above the Basic 
Income is discretionary.  Other kinds of programs remain, such as subsidies for people with 
special needs, as do universalistic programs, such as public education and health care.
90
  In 




The feasibility of a Basic Income System was historically doubted for two main reasons.  
The first objection was that making the Basic Income unconditional on the performance of 
any labor would give rise to a society of ―free-riders‖ and ultimately lead to economic 
collapse.  This pessimistic outlook, however, has been proven unjustified.  Few would be 
surprised to hear that the ―free-rider‖ problem does exist to a certain extent today—that is, 
there are indeed some who live off the Basic Income but who choose not to contribute to 
society in any discernable way.  However, it turns out that human beings, by and large, are 
social creatures, who find being engaged in their community’s work more meaningful and 
fulfilling than being isolated, idle, and parasitic on the community.  Furthermore, the very 
small minority that choose not to contribute in any way prove to be a tolerable burden—
certainly more tolerable than the levels of poverty which persisted within the property 
systems of late capitalism.  A large majority of citizens remain in some form of paid 
employment, and the percentage that do not are typically engaged in other forms of socially 
necessary and beneficial work, such as raising children, working in community gardens or 
local energy centers, volunteering at the esteemed and well-organized Centers for Social 




The second objection concerned the feasibility of financing a Basic Income System, 
an issue which is obviously of great importance, although it was and remains a matter of 
political commitment more than a financing issue.  Basic Income entitlements did create a 
new and significant financial burden on the public purse; however, changes to public 
spending as well as significant tax reforms
93
 have been sufficient, in many of the wealthier 
jurisdictions, at least, to gradually raise the Basic Income to a minimal level of dignified 
subsistence.  Those jurisdictions around the globe which are still transitioning toward a 
subsistence-level Basic Income System are often called ―Guaranteed Income Systems‖ 
(which guarantee a certain level of income, but below subsistence levels, meaning that some 
supplementary income is still necessary through earnings).  Another method several nations 
have used to progress toward a Basic Income System is to establish a Negative Income Tax 
System, which differs from a Basic Income in that it provides a tax credit (typically 
beginning at low levels and increasing over time) to those with low incomes, providing such 
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low-earners with a minimum income but by an alternative route.
94
  These approaches of 
incrementally raising the level of Guaranteed Income or Negative Income Tax to establish a 
fully developed system of Basic Income were key both to the financial viability and the 
political attractiveness of the Basic Income policy objective. 
It is worth noting that a Basic Income System or one of its varieties does tend to slow 
growth in the economies in which they operate, for the reason that such systems—consonant 
with the predictions of orthodox economic theory—inevitably provide fewer incentives for 
citizens to dedicate so much of their energy to productive activity.  But because the wealthiest 
nations today are no longer anxious to grow, and many are even voluntarily transitioning by 
way of degrowth to a steady-state economy,
95
 the whole question of maximizing incentives is 
much less pressing.  Indeed, the level at which governments set a Basic or Guaranteed 
Income can be a device to control, to a certain extent, the level of growth/degrowth in an 
economy. 
The social benefits of the Basic Income were profound and far-reaching.  Beyond 
eliminating poverty and economic insecurity—which were the primary functions of a Basic 
Income System—its gradual institution also strengthened the bargaining position of workers, 
because it gave them a livelihood that was independent of their paid employment and thus 
more power to demand decent working conditions.  It also meant that people did not have to 
accept alienating, exploitative, or degrading jobs just to survive; nor was there any real 
pressure to sacrifice social and political autonomy in order to achieve economic security.
96
  
Furthermore, introducing the Basic Income was effectively an acknowledgement of the worth 
of unpaid caring work and other forms of social contribution, thereby extending economic 
citizenship beyond participants in the traditional labor market.
97
  For these reasons, among 
others, the legal restructuring of property relations based upon the notion of Basic Income has 
done much to create more democratic and egalitarian societies.  By structurally promoting 




C.  Progressive Income Tax and the Maximum Wage 
 
In general, the property systems of Entropia are shaped by highly progressive income 
or consumption taxes which fund a considerable portion of the state’s policies, including the 
Basic Income entitlement.
99
  Progressive forms of taxation were in place even within the 
paradigm of growth capitalism, so there is little need to address the matter of justification in 
any detail.  Put simply, progressive taxation is justified primarily on the dual grounds of 
equity and utility.  That is, because it is equitable for the richest to pay more than the poorest 
to fund the state’s policies, and because the diminishing marginal utility of money means that 
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the more money one has, the less utility or happiness one can buy with each further dollar 
(i.e., one dollar is more valuable to a poor person than to a rich person), some redistribution is 
an efficient use of resources.  What distinguished the politics of Entropia from growth 
capitalism was how progressive taxation was used to effectively create a ―maximum wage‖ 
or ―income cap.‖
100
  Let us consider this central development. 
Just as most at the beginning of the 20th Century had trouble imagining how their 
ancestors could have stomached slavery, so we at the end of the 21st Century are dismayed 
by the truly excessive incomes that some executives, managers, shareholders, doctors, 
lawyers, and other professionals received not so long ago.
101
  We cannot understand why it 
was ever permitted for some incomes to reach into the millions or tens of millions of dollars 
when many workers—sometimes even those working in the same enterprise—received little 
more than an (insecure) subsistence wage.  We consider such disparities plainly objectionable 
on many grounds:  they undermine democracy and social solidarity, they encourage grossly 
extravagant lifestyles, and they simply cannot be justified by any appeal to proportional merit 
or social contribution.
102
  The politics of Entropia, of course, never advocated anything like 
strict equality in incomes.  Much inequality remains.  However, it is widely taken for granted 
today that some limits must be placed on individual incomes, and a simple restructure of 
progressive income tax policy provided a straightforward method for doing so. 
An income tax is ―progressive‖ when the tax rate increases as the taxable income 
increases.  In theory, at least, all income over a certain amount could be taxed completely, 
thereby creating a ―maximum wage‖ or ―income cap.‖  Although only New Zealand’s 
Remuneration Justice Act 2038 has actually gone this far, all of the Western economies have 
gradually established a top income bracket which is taxed more than ninety percent (which, 
strictly speaking, does not place any ―cap‖ as such on incomes, but functions in a similar 
way).
103
  The income level of the top tax bracket also varies between nations—often starting 
high, for political reasons, and then decreasing—but today it generally sits quite stably 
around ten to fifteen times the level of the Basic Income.
104
 
One may have thought that the introduction of such policies would have been 
politically controversial in the extreme, given the history of limitless incomes, but it turned 
out that this was not the case.  Although there were certainly loud objections from advocates 
of the ―free market,‖ various referenda were held which unambiguously demonstrated that 
the policies had overwhelming public support, doubtless owing to the fact that the maximum 
wage would only limit the incomes of a very small minority of people.  Political 
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D.  Worker Cooperatives 
 
Capitalist economic relations paradigmatically involved workers selling their labor to 
the owners of productive assets and those owners then selling the commodities produced for 
more than the cost of the labor that went into making them, thereby making a ―profit.‖  We 
attribute to Karl Marx, more than any other, the thesis that this capitalist mode of production 
and exchange exploits workers.
105
  It is exploitative, Marx argued, because workers are paid 
less for their labor than the value of the commodities they produce.
106
  The solution he 
proposed was to abolish all private ownership of productive assets and replace it with state 
ownership; that is, to replace capitalism with communism.
107
 
Many involved in the politics of Entropia were sympathetic to (without wholly 
subscribing to) the view that workers, to varying extents, were exploited under the capitalist 
mode of production and its legal superstructure; yet, for various reasons, they did not see 
state ownership of productive assets as the solution.  Rather than state communism, what 
emerged instead were various forms of ―market-socialist‖ property systems in which worker 
cooperatives are increasingly the dominant economic form.  These enterprises are owned by 
their workers and democratically operated on a ―one person, one vote‖ basis, thereby 
avoiding the exploitative relationships which Marx and others criticised so vehemently.
108
  
The cooperatives still fall within the private property paradigm, however, because workers 
still have individual ownership interests in them, and the state does not determine what the 
cooperatives produce.  Furthermore, the economy is still based on market exchanges, because 
cooperatives gain income by selling their goods and services to customers.  In doing this, 
they compete with other cooperatives (and other small businesses of the allowable types).  
The primary difference with growth capitalism is that large corporate entities employing non-
shareholders have largely disappeared.
109
 
The transition to this type of ―stakeholder society‖ was facilitated both by public 
policy and cultural changes, each promoting the other in a dialectical fashion.  When 
governments decided that broadening the ownership base of the economy was to be a policy 
goal, the first step in that direction was often to make the tax rates for worker cooperatives 
extremely attractive compared to the tax rates for the traditional ―owner-shareholder‖ 
corporate entities.  Governments also began explicitly preferring worker cooperatives when 
contracting with the private sector, and whenever possible government spending was directed 
toward worker cooperatives.  Various types of development banks were also created through 
which governments began funding new businesses which were required to establish 
themselves as worker cooperatives.  Collectively, these strategies, and many others, were able 
to create fertile conditions in which worker cooperatives could take root, multiply, and 
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flourish.  It was arguably a shift in consumer attitudes, however, that was the deepest driver 
of change.  When private individuals began choosing to direct their expenditure toward 
cooperative enterprises, the old corporate structures gradually withered away as a natural 
consequence of market forces.  This is a powerful reminder that how we spend our money is 
how we vote on what exists in the world.
110
 
The emergence of worker cooperatives has been one of the most significant 
developments in the transition toward Entropia.  It has expanded democratic decision-making 
beyond representative politics to include the everyday realm of economics, giving people 
much more control over their lives.  Though democratizing the internal workings of business 
enterprises has created new inefficiencies—e.g., decision-making can be slower—the fact 
that workers now have a real stake in the businesses within which they work has also created 
new forms of efficiency and fostered a new ethics of productivity and collective 
responsibility.
111
  The material rewards of production are also distributed more evenly, 
though strict equality is rarely practiced (or expected).  Beyond these appealing features, 
worker cooperatives have also functioned to be more ecologically sensitive than the old 
corporate forms, because businesses owned and managed by local citizens take more care 
than ―absentee owners‖ to ensure business practices do not harm the environment.
112
  Finally, 
cooperatives also seem to have engendered a greater sense of social solidarity and community, 
as workers belong to and participate in stable associations of people with common interests 




E.  Land Law and the Duty Not to Harm 
 
Although all of the reforms described above had ecological benefits, more direct and 
immediate legal and political action was needed to adequately confront the ecological crisis.  
The difficulty here was the enduring influence of the neoliberal conception of property, 
which resisted state regulation in the economy.
114
  It was a remarkably simple question, 
however, which gave rise to a radically new approach:  Do property owners have the right to 
use land in ecologically unsustainable ways?  Although the response came dangerously late, 
lawmakers eventually answered that question in the negative.  Let us consider the general line 
of argument. 
To question whether a person or entity possesses a property right to engage in a 
particular activity is to acknowledge, as we must, that property rights are not absolute but in 
some sense always limited.
115
  Outdated imagery aside, ownership does not and cannot entail 
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the right to ―do as one pleases‖ with the property one owns, for that would be plainly self-
defeating.  It would allow others to use their property in ways that harmed one’s own 
property or indeed oneself, and thus even the most hard-nosed libertarians have always 
accepted that the ownership of property necessarily entails a ―duty not to harm.‖
116
  As 
Hohfeld explained long ago, this ―duty not to harm‖ places limits on the ―right to use.‖
117
 
One important consequence of this is that state regulation which prevents ―harmful 
use‖ cannot be considered a violation of property rights, because property holders simply do 
not have the right to harm others or the property of others.  In other words, such preventative 
action would not be ―taking‖ anything that owners ever held (or properly held), from which it 
follows that in such circumstances no right to compensation could arise.  What this means, 
also, is that regulation of the property system which prevents ―harmful use‖ should not be 
understood to be changing the prior regime, but only maintaining and enforcing the ―rightful 
scope‖ of the prior regime in which the duty not to harm was always recognized. 
This blurs the distinction between ―property‖ and ―regulation.‖
118
  Regulation is 
normally conceived of as something that interferes with property rights.  But when the state 
intervenes in the property system to stop ―harmful use,‖ then such intervention is not so much 
the regulation of property as it is the maintenance or protection of property.  And this more 
accurate reframing of the issue has been of rhetorical significance to ecological reformers, 
especially in the first quarter of this century when ―regulation‖ was such a dirty word. 
In the midst of the ecological crisis, when nothing less than Nature’s life-support 
systems were at risk of collapsing, lawmakers realized that they needed to pay much more 
attention to the duty of property holders not to cause ―harm.‖  Exactly what constitutes harm, 
at any given time, is indeterminate and often contentious, of course, but that just means that it 
is a concept that must be defined democratically, for the common good.  As one pioneering 
legal ecologist at the turn of the century noted, ―Harm . . . is an elastic, vague concept that we 
can define in whatever way we deem wise. . . . By redefining harm we can [for example] 
challenge and end land uses we don’t want.‖
119
  This theorist added, however, with an air of 
caution, that ―government wields breathtaking power when it can define harm however it sees 
fit.‖
120
  That was (and remains) true, but as Nature was being degraded as never before there 
were far greater risks in the government not doing enough to enforce the ―duty not to harm‖ 
than there were in it doing too much. 
As the problems of overconsumption, loss of biodiversity, and climate change 
intensified, the meaning of the ―duty not to harm‖ inevitably expanded, narrowing the 
rightful scope of property rights.
121
  By intervening in the property system to enforce this 
―duty not to harm,‖ the state was not actually changing the prior regime, properly understood, 
but only maintaining the ―rightful scope‖ of the prior regime in which the duty not to harm 
was always recognized.  Accordingly, such preventative action or maintenance was not 
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―taking‖ anything that owners ever held (or properly held), from which it followed that in 
such circumstances no right to compensation could arise. 
To provide a famous, ground-breaking example of this approach, we need only note 
the case of Australia, which, in 2025, was the first nation to pass legislation to the effect that 
coal mining and the logging of old-growth forests were no longer acceptable uses of land, and 
would be faded out (with minor exceptions).  Unsurprisingly, powerful economic agents at 
this time cried out piously about the alleged violation of their property rights; all the more so 
when they received little or no compensation.  But slave owners once cried out in the same 
vein, and their claims to compensation were also properly ignored.  In short, once lawmakers 
decided that property law had been wrong to protect certain use rights, and that no such rights 
did or should exist, it was considered contradictory to grant compensation as if the property 
rights did exist after all.  As the preamble to the Australian Land Ethics (Amendment) Act 
2025 still reads: ―The government does not accept for compensation purposes the very 




F.  Inheritance and Bequest 
 
Another key feature in the transition from growth capitalism to the politics of 
Entropia was the revolutionary reforms that took place in relation to the laws of inheritance 
and bequest.  A few words will suffice to convey the essence of these changes and their 
salutary effects. 
Opposition to the laws of inheritance and bequest was as old as the laws 
themselves.
123
  Allowing huge concentrations of wealth to be passed down a family line, from 
generation to generation, was often criticized for being an inequitable relic of feudalism that 
somehow survived the transition to capitalism.  The overthrow of feudalism was driven, after 
all, by distaste for the arbitrary birthright privileges (of wealth, status, and power) that were 
bestowed upon the ―nobility.‖  Simultaneously, one of the bedrock principles of political 
liberalism which shaped the post-feudal world was a commitment to ―equality of 
opportunity,‖ that is, to the belief that success in life should be based as far as possible on 
merit, not accident, chance, or caste.
124
  Yet, despite entrenching arbitrary privileges and 
keeping concentrations of wealth intact for reasons other than merit, the laws of inheritance 
and bequest endured for hundreds of years after the transition to capitalism, almost as if they 
were essential to a private property system.
125
 
But essential they are not.  Private property is a concept that has many conceptions.  
According to one persistent conception (useful though incomplete), property is a ―bundle of 
rights.‖  What is clear is that the ―bundle of rights‖ can be reconfigured, sometimes 
significantly, while remaining a private property system, and over the last century private 
property has indeed been significantly reconfigured.  In various ways (discussed below), the 
right to bequeath one’s property upon death has been disaggregated from the bundle of rights 
associated with property ownership.  And when that right goes, so too does any alleged right 
of potential beneficiaries to inherit property.  The politics of Entropia have shown not only 
that there can be private property systems which do not recognize the right to bequeath or 
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inherit property, but also that such revised systems better accord with the arguments (based 




Nevertheless, despite the conceptual possibility and normative attractiveness of a 
private property system that does not recognize the rights of inheritance and bequest, 
reconfiguring the ―bundle of rights‖ in that manner required political tact.  Rather than an 
outright abolition of those inheritance and bequest laws, in most jurisdictions it proved to be 
politically more attractive to gradually increase inheritance taxes and gift taxes.  In fact, even 
today, bequest and inheritance are still technically recognized in most of the advanced 
economies, where allowances are properly made for dependents (children, parents, and 
grandparents who are in need of support), as well as certain other exceptions (such as limited 
gifts to charities).  But beyond providing for the essential needs of dependents, which is very 
limited in our age of the Basic Income, and other minor exceptions, a citizen’s property upon 
death is generally taxed in excess of ninety percent.  This effectively (though not technically) 
disaggregates the right of bequest from the bundle of rights associated with ownership.  It is 
perhaps surprising that only in England, where the roots of feudalism were deepest, have 
inheritance and bequest been abolished outright.  In that jurisdiction, a citizen’s property 
upon death is now distributed by the Justice Tribunal, which was established in 2042.
127
  It is 
a system that has acquired wide support.  Whether other jurisdictions eventually follow the 
English example remains to be seen. 
Whether through taxation or outright abolition, disaggregating inheritance and 
bequest from the institution of private property has been a landmark achievement on the path 
to Entropia.  Not only has it contributed greatly to the democratic ideals of equality of 
opportunity in life and a broad-based distribution of wealth, it also provided (and still 
provides) states around the world with the public resources necessary to adequately confront 
the ecological crisis and adapt to climate change.  In fact, many political parties, particularly 
in Western Europe, campaigned for the reform of inheritance and bequest laws on the very 
basis that the bulk of the new tax revenues would be directed toward environmental 
initiatives.  Indeed, it would be fair to say that the transition to clean and renewable energy 
systems that we saw over the first half of this century was funded, to a large extent, by the 
proceeds of the property and tax reforms related to inheritance and bequest. 
 
G.  Working Hours 
 
The reforms outlined above represent the most significant structural changes that 
occurred over the last century to Western-style property systems.  Before concluding our 
review of the paradigm shift, it is important to note one final revolutionary reform, this time 
in labor law, which is considered central to the politics of Entropia. 
Over the last century working hours in the West have dramatically decreased, 
representing a culture-wide exchange of money for time.  This was partly due to cultural 
changes in attitudes to consumption (i.e., the less one consumes the less one needs to work to 
support one’s lifestyle), but it was also facilitated by structural changes.  Economic theory 
posits that actors in an economy should be free to maximize their happiness (or ―utility‖) by 
selling as much or as little of their time (or ―labor-power‖) as they want.
128
  Under growth 
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capitalism, however, there were structural biases that functioned to promote over-work (i.e., 
working hours that were not ―optimal‖ or ―utility maximizing‖), such as laws which treated 
the forty-hour work week as ―standard‖ and which excluded part-time workers from many of 
the non-pecuniary benefits enjoyed by those who work full-time.  The effect of these 
structural biases was essentially to force many people to work longer hours than they wanted 
or needed to, which gave rise to cultures that tended to over-consume resources and under-
consume leisure.
129
  This led to higher GDP per capita, of course, but often at the cost of 
quality of life, and the planet.
130
 
 During the 21st Century, led by Western European nations, many jurisdictions first 
introduced the thirty-five-hour work week, then the twenty-eight-hour work week, and in 
places even the twenty-one-hour work week.
131
  In a progressive response to pressures arising 
from the GFC, the U.S. state of Utah, for example, shifted to a four-day work week for all 
public employees.  Almost immediately it was reported that the resulting pattern of work 
reduction led to ―significant environmental benefits, with reduced transport and energy 
costs.‖
132
  Furthermore, the extra day off also led to a ―dramatic increase in community 
volunteering.‖
133
  Many governments around the world have shown leadership in this regard, 
by down-shifting most government positions to a reduced work week and by providing tax 
incentives to private employers which do the same. 
 As well as reducing the standard work week, labor laws have also been broadly 
reformed to better protect those in part-time employment and those who wish to job-share.  In 
many places these policies have gone a long way to eliminating unemployment (because 
labor is systematically spread); furthermore, the increase in leisure has resulted in many other 
social and ecological benefits, including healthier and happier populations with more time to 
pursue their private passions and enjoy their civic responsibilities, and with lower ecological 
footprints (because they are consuming and travelling less).
134
  The Working Hours 
Adjustment Act 2000 in The Netherlands is representative of the structural changes which 
occurred in this regard.  This path-breaking act allowed workers to reduce their hours to part-
time simply by asking their employers.
135
  As explained by pioneering work reductionist John 
de Graaf: 
 
Unless there is a clear hardship for the firm—something shown in less than 
5% of cases—the employer must grant the reduction in hours.  Workers keep 
the same hourly salary, full health-care, and pro-rata additional benefits like 
vacation time and pensions.  This law, in the most concrete terms, allows 
workers to trade money for time, without losing their jobs or healthcare.  As a 
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 Those who complained that these work policies would not maximize GDP per capita 
were obviously missing the point.  The point of an economy is to efficiently promote quality 
of life, and if a smaller economy promotes quality of life by providing increased leisure but 
less money for its participants, then a smaller economy is the most economically rational 




V.  CONCLUSION:  THE LAW OF PROGRESSIVE SIMPLIFICATION 
 
 According to Arnold Toynbee’s ―Law of Progressive Simplification,‖
138
 as a 
civilization evolves it will come to transfer increasing increments of energy and attention 
from the material (money and possessions) to the non-material side of life (relationships, 
contemplation, community, art, and so on).  If we accept this aspect of Toynbee’s conception 
of history, which posits simplicity of living as the peak of civilization, then ours has 
ultimately been a century of progress.  As Toynbee and others predicted, nature compelled us 
to revert to a stable state on the material plane and thus we found ourselves forced to turn to 
the realm of the spirit to satisfy our hunger for infinity.  As the dust settles upon the path we 
have travelled this century, we look back and gain a new prospect of the world and our place 
in it.  When placed in the context of history, the changes we have seen have surely been as 
great as the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
 If there is one lesson that humanity will take from this difficult century, it will be that 
legal and political reforms in property relations which slow or even have a negative impact 
on growth, and which thereby lower ―standard of living‖ (measured by per capita income), 
can actually increase ―quality of life‖ (measured by subjective well-being).  Put otherwise, 
the lesson is that lower productivity is a small price to pay for unprecedented well-being, the 
advancement of distributive justice, and enhanced ecological conditions.  Looking back we 
see how easy it would have been to avoid so much suffering and destruction had we only 
realized this earlier, or, rather, had we only acted earlier upon that which we knew very well. 
 Of course, despite huge advances, our world today is far from perfect.  Global poverty 
has not been eradicated and it is probably too early to claim that the ecological crisis is over.  
In particular, we will still need to adapt as the climate changes further, and the countless 
tonnes of carbon deposited in the atmosphere by earlier generations may still have 
unforeseeable impacts on global ecosystems.  But genuine and significant progress has 
unquestionably been made.  Far from signifying the end of history, however, it is clear that 
this moment in time, like every moment, is simply the beginning of the future.  And that is 
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